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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to §78-2-3(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue presented for decision is whether the limits of
liability for underinsured motorist coverage in an automobile
insurance policy is excess to the liability payment of a tortfeasor or whether the liability coverage of the tort-feasor is to
be subtracted from the limit of liability of the underinsured
motorist coverage.
The standard of review on this appeal from a summary judgment
is that this court will view facts and inferences in light most
favorable to the appellant and may freely substitute its judgment
of the law for that of the district court. Utah State Coalition of
Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632 (Utah
1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Appellant claims there are no determinative Utah statutes
applicable to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a declaratory judgment action filed by an insurance
company

against its insureds for a determination

of whether

insurance coverage existed for a certain accident described below.
The insureds countercl aimed asking the court to not only find that
1

coverage exists, but to also find that the limits of liability were
excess to the liability coverage of the vehicle owner.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The Complaint in this action was filed January 26, 1990 in the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. Record, p. 2.
The defendants answered and filed a Counterclaim on February 12,
1990. Record, p. 11. On August 21, 1990, plaintiff filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Record, p. 28. Defendants filed their own

Motion for Summary Judgment on August 23, 1990. Record, p. 118.
After appropriate memoranda were filed in support and in
opposition to the respective motions, the court entered a Memorandum Decision dated October 19, 1990.

Record, p. 279.

A formal

Order Granting Defendants Summary Judgment was entered November 1,
1990.

Record, p. 292.

Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal on

November 28, 1990. Record, p. 303.
C,

Disposition at Trial Court

As explained above, this action was resolved by granting the
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Appellant has not

appealed the district court's judgment that underinsurance coverage
was in place for the accident at issue.

The appeal is made from

that portion of the summary judgment which found that the entire
underinsurance

coverage

is available

to

the

deduction for payment made by the tort-feasor.

2

insured

without

STATEMENT OF FACTS
All of the following facts were submitted to the district
court by USF&G in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and
were undisputed by the defendants. Compare Record pp. 32 - 36 with
Record p. 186. Those facts are:
1.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is an insurance

company regularly engaged in the business of writing automobile
insurance in the state of Utah.
2.

Robert and Linda Sandt are husband and wife residing in

Summit County, Utah.
3.

Sean Sandt is the son of Linda Sandt and a step-son of

Robert Sandt.
4.

His date of birth is May 5, 1974.

As of July 17, 1989, USF&G had issued an automobile

insurance policy for Robert and Linda Sandt.
5.

The insurance policy at issue contained coverage known

commonly as underinsured motorist coverage.
6.

Approximately three weeks prior to the night of July 16,

1989, Dustin Sturges, then 13 years old, found a set of keys his
mother had lost to her 1985 Toyota pick-up truck. He kept the keys
without telling his mother he had found them.
7.

On the evening of July 16, 1989, Dustin Sturges, Sean

Sandt, and another friend, Tony Holder, age 14, gathered together
at the home of Dustin Sturges for a sleep over.

They were joined

later that evening by another friend, Elijah Molitar, age 13.
8.

After the adults in the home had gone to bed, the four

boys, as established by deposition testimony, "snuck downstairs and
3

outside" to the pick-up truck parked in the driveway.

With the

lights off, all of the boys, including Sean Sandt, pushed the truck
backwards out of the driveway and then down the street a few houses
with the engine off.
earlier.

They then drove off using the keys found

They did not have permission from the owner of the

vehicle to use the truck nor were any of them of legal age to
possess a Utah driver's license.
9.

The boys drove around the Park City area for approximate-

ly two hours when they were involved in an accident in which the
truck rolled and Sean Sandt received substantial and, apparently,
permanent injury.
10.

Medical costs are in excess of $400,000.

The Sturges' vehicle involved in the accident was covered

by an automobile liability policy issued by Farmer's Insurance
Company.

Farmer's paid its policy limit of $100,000 out of

liability coverage for its insured for the benefit of Sean Sandt.
Record pp. 70 - 71.
11.

Sean Sandt was paid $5,000 by Farmers in addition to the

$100,000 under the Sturges' personal injury protection coverage.
Record p. 71.
12.

The underinsurance coverage by USF&G for Robert and Linda

Sandt on their own vehicle not involved in the accident was
$300,000.
13.

Record p. 47.
USF&G has paid $200,000 to the Sandts. Record p. 296.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

USF&G claims that the district court erred in finding that the
entire $300,000 policy limit of underinsured motorist coverage is
4

in place for this accident.

Instead, the plain language of the

policy at issue makes clear that the $100,000 payment made by the
insurer for the vehicle involved in the accident should be deducted
from the policy limit so that the available coverage is $200,000
instead of the $300,000 claimed and awarded by the district court.
This conclusion is consistent with the plain language of the
policy, consistent with public policy, and consistent with the
recognized operation of underinsured motorist policies nationwide.
ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction

As an examination of the entire record will reflect, the
original thrust of the declaratory judgment action filed by USF&G
was to ask the court to determine whether coverage existed under
the circumstances of underage operators knowingly using the motor
vehicle without permission of the owner. The district court found
that coverage existed and a determination was made by USF&G to not
challenge that ruling on appeal. However, the district court made
substantial error in finding that the full $300,000 underinsured
motorist coverage is excess to the $100,000 paid by the tortfeasor's

insurer.

An examination of the court's Memorandum

Opinion, at Record pp. 287 - 288, shows that this substantial issue
was treated rather perfunctorily by the district court.

The

district court apparently failed to apply the usual rules of
interpretation of insurance policies as explained more fully below.

5

B.

Applicable Law

Utah has well defined rules of interpretation of insurance
policies and contracts which control resolution of the action here.
Specifically, an insurance contract should be interpreted according
to the plain meaning of its words unless ambiguity is found. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Commercial Union Assurance. 606 P.2d
1206 (Utah 1980). As with other contracts, meaning may be obtained
by examining the document as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d
1105 (Utah 1982).

Ambiguity in a contract is said to exist where

the words used to express meaning and intention of the parties are
subject to reasonable interpretation in more than one way.
Realty, Inc. v. Willeyr 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988).

C.J.

However,

ambiguity is not found as the result of a mere disagreement of the
parties arguing different interpretation.

Instead, it is an

objective review of the language in light of how it would be
understood by an average, reasonable purchaser of insurance.
Drauahon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y. 771 P. 2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989);
Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit Assoc. 589 P.2d 780 (Utah 1979).
Finally, where ambiguity is found, interpretation should be
construed against the insurer, but the ordinary meaning of the
words used should still be given force.

Fuller v. Director of

Finance, 694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985).
C.

The Policy at Issue

The entire USF&G policy for the Sandts is contained in the
record at pp. 45 - 68.

For purposes of this appeal, only the

underinsured motorist coverage provisions, contained in record pp.
6

5 8 - 6 0 , are at issue and attached as an exhibit to this Brief.
Also attached as an exhibit for the courts information is a copy
of the declaration page of the policy found in the record at p. 47.
A reading

of the underinsured

motorist

coverage

in its

entirety shows that the intent of the policy language is to pay an
insured for bodily injury received from the negligence of one
operating an underinsured motor vehicle.

An underinsured motor

vehicle is defined as a motor vehicle for which insurance coverage
exists but "...its limit for bodily injury liability is less than
the limit of liability for this coverage."
The underinsurance coverage provides a specific limit of
liability.

The policy provides in relevant part:

The limit of liability shown in the schedule [$300,000
here] for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability
for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is
the most we will pay regardless of the number of:...

...However, the limit of liability shall be reduced by
all sums paid because of the bodily injury by or on
behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally
responsible. This includes all sums paid under part A
[liability coverage] of this policy.
The decision of the district court put into issue the "other
insurance" provision of the underinsurance coverage.

That clause

is as follows:
If there is other applicable similar insurance, we will
pay only our share of the loss.
Our share is the
proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total
of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be
excess over any other collectable insurance.

7

Finally, the underinsurance

coverage

contains provisions

relating to exclusions and arbitration which are not at issue in
this appeal.
D.

The Plain Language of the Policy is Not Ambiguous

If one applies the rules of determining whether ambiguity
exists as recited above, it is apparent that the plain language of
the underinsured motorist coverage is not ambiguous regarding the
limit of liability.

Reading the four corners of the coverage

language, a reasonable person would readily understand the coverage
being offered. The policy follows a logical procedure in explaining that coverage is being extended for bodily injury incurred at
the hand of an operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.

The

policy then defines an underinsured motor vehicle as one having
limits of liability less than the limit of liability for the
underinsured motorist coverage.
The limit of liability language further explains that if the
insured is able to collect for his injuries from other persons
legally responsible for those injuries, such collection will serve
to reduce the limit of liability.
Put in the context of this case, the Sturges' vehicle had
$100,000 of liability coverage.

The Sandts, under the USF&G

policy, had $300,000 of underinsured motorist coverage.

Applying

the language of the limit of liability, the $100,000 collected from
the Sturges' insurer is subtracted from the $300,000 coverage
limit. To hold anything else would be to read out of the underin-

8

sured motorist coverage all of the language of the limit of
liability and render it meaningless.
This interpretation of the plain language of the policy is
based upon the plain meaning of the words used, does not require
the invoking of any new legal rule of interpretation or tortured
construction of the words, and is consistent with the nature of the
product purchased.

The rules of interpretation require that

insurance policies be considered in the light of a reasonable
purchaser of insurance. Inherent in that rule of interpretation is
the assumption that a reasonable person would have some awareness
of the product of which they are purchasing.

The very nature of

underinsured motorist coverage is that one is purchasing a certain
limit of coverage to guard against the tort-feasor that may not
have the insurance coverage desired.
Law and Practice, §5071.45 (1981).

See 8C Appleman, Insurance
As explained in Hiagins v.

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 770 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1989), the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage is to place the injured party in the
same position as to the recovery of damages that he would have had
if the tort-feasor had possessed liability insurance in the amount
of the underinsured policy limits.
When

one

takes

into

account

what

underinsured

motorist

coverage is by nature, it is seen that appellees' claim that an
offset should not be made for the $100,000 paid by Farmer's
Insurance Company is analogous to one purchasing an automobile and
then complaining that he did not know you had to put air in the
tires.

Some assumption should be made that a purchaser has a
9

reasonable knowledge of the fundamental nature of the product
purchased.

By definition, one who is purchasing underinsured

motorist coverage is purchasing protection to a certain limit in
case the tort-feasor has less coverage.

Holding the coverage as

excess is outside of the concept of uninsured motorist coverage and
really constitutes a whole new kind of coverage more analogous to
formal excess or umbrella type policies. The language contained in
the policy is not unclear to any degree to justify creating a whole
new basic concept of what underinsured motorist coverage is by
nature.
E.

Reducing the Limit of Liability by the Tort-Feasor's
Payment is Consistent with Public Policy.

As this court will likely discover, Utah has no specific case
law addressing underinsured motorist coverage. Unfortunately, Utah
also does not have any statutes addressing underinsured motorist
coverage.

A reading of case law from other states shows that the

case law is generally helpful in pointing out analysis and policy,
but is admittedly not controlling as the cases are highly dependent
upon statutes in other states.
One statute that is instructive in making an analysis for Utah
is §31A-22-305(6), Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.

The

entirety of §305 addresses uninsured motorist coverage. Uninsured
motorist coverage is coverage purchased by an insured for protection against tort-feasors that carry no insurance.

Underinsured

motorist coverage is distinguishable for the obvious reason that
the tort-feasor has some insurance at the time of the accident at
10

issue.

Both coverages are very similar in their operation and

other states frequently refer to underinsured coverage as a branch
of uninsured motorist coverage.

See, 2 Widiss, Uninsured and

Underinsured Motorist Insurance, §31.4 (2d Ed.); Schmick v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 P.2d 1092 (N.M. 1985).
In §31A-22-305(6) the law provides:
(6)
In no event shall the limit of liability for
uninsured motorist coverage for two or more motor
vehicles be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an
injured person for any one accident.
This statutory provision makes clear that the public policy of
Utah is to not stack or combine uninsured motorist coverage in such
a way as to exceed the limit of liability for uninsured motorist
coverage.

This court may conclude that the coverages are of

sufficient similarity that there is no compelling policy to treat
underinsured

coverage

differently

by

coverages against legislative policy.

combining

or

stacking

Sge, Bates v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins.P 719 P.2d 171 (Wash. App. 1986).
In construing a similar clause in an underinsured motorist
coverage case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that Idaho, like
Utah, had no applicable underinsured motorist coverage statutes.
The court held that usual non-insurance contract principles ought
to have more weight in analyzing underinsurance questions than in
the instance of uninsured motorist coverage where the legislature
had declared public policies.
701 P.2d 217 (Idaho 1985).

Meckert v. TransAmerica Ins. Co. r

The case is helpful here because it

shows that in a similar legal context, this court may find that
11

there is no compelling policy in insurance or contract law to void
the limit of liability language of the insurance policy.

In fact,

the Utah legislature has decided that exceeding or combining limits
of liability in the analogous uninsured motorist coverage is not
the public policy of this state.
The position argued by USF&G here is not overreaching and is
consistent with that taken by other courts.
McAllaster v. Bruton, 655 F. Supp. 1371

For example, in

(D. Me. 1987), the

deduction of payment by the tort-feasor from underinsured motorist
coverage was upheld.

In Dilenno v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 632

F. Supp. 1253 (D. Del. 1986), the court found no underinsurance
coverage was available where the tort-feasor's liability coverage
was equal to the underinsurance coverage of the injured person. An
offset of the payment of a tort-feasor was upheld under another
USF&G policy in Davidson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 336
S.E.2d 709 (N.C. App. 1985)
Still other states have upheld the offsetting of payments of
the tort-feasor against underinsurance policy limits.

Without

reciting the facts of each, the court's attention is drawn to
LaFrange v. United Services Auto. Assoc.r

700 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.

1985); Muller v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 627 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.
1981); Wert v. Picciano. 459 A.2d 697 (N.J. Super. 1982); and MidCentury Ins. Co. v. Daniel. 705 P.2d 156 (Nev. 1985).
In summary, the very nature of underinsured motorist coverage
is that the limits of liability of the tort-feasor's insurance
policy will be offset against the underinsured motorist coverage
12

purchased.

Utah has no particular law on the point, but a number

of other states have upheld the offsetting of the coverage.

By

analogy, the Utah public policy against exceeding the limits of
liability of uninsured motorist coverage is instructive that this
court should follow the same policy with respect to underinsured
motorist coverage.
F.

The "Other Insurance" Clause is Inapplicable

Appellees argued at the district court level, and the district
court accepted, that the underinsured motorist coverage provision
entitled "Other Insurance" created an ambiguity in the policy
because of the language to the effect that the underinsurance
coverage "shall be excess over any other collectable insurance".
This interpretation is patently incorrect and arises out of a
combination of lack of understanding of what an "other insurance"
clause is and how it is to work with respect to underinsured
motorist coverage.
Research reveals that there is no apparent controlling Utah
case law or statutes and that there are very few cases in other
jurisdictions which interpret an other insurance clause in the
context of underinsured motorist coverage.

Fortunately, some

commentators have addressed the issue and the intended operation of
that clause.
In 2 Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage,
§40.1 gt seq. (2d Ed.), a comprehensive discussion of the operation
of other insurance clauses in the context of underinsured coverage
is given. Widiss sets out the exact language which is contained in
13

the USF&G policy here and then explains its meaning. As explained,
the purpose of this clause is to address two situations. The first
are those situations in which the policy provides a pro rata
coverage and the second are those situations in which the policy
provides excess coverage.
Widiss explains that the phrase "other applicable similar
insurance" is referring to other existing underinsured motorist
coverage. For example, one may own more than one vehicle and have
underinsured coverage with different companies for each of the
vehicles.

In that situation, the other insurance clause operates

to prorate the payment to the insured between the two existing
underinsured policies. Put in the context of this case, the clause
would apply if the Sandts had two vehicles with underinsured
coverage for each.

A pro rata payment would be required.

Addressing the second situation of when excess coverage is
available under this clause, Widiss recognizes the danger of the
exact error which the district court made in this case.

As he

explains at §40.1:
The meaning of this aspect of the Other Insurance
provision might be much less obvious were it to be viewed
independently of the developments of the uninsured
motorist coverage.
However, when considered in the
context established by the uninsured motorist coverage,
the meaning intended for this provision is generally well
understood by judges and lawyers, as well as by insurers.
The objective of the provision is to have the underinsured motorist insurance of the policy in which this
clause appears treated as excess
coverage - over any
other collectable underinsured motorist insurance - when
an insured is injured while occupying a vehicle that is
not owned by the named insured, the spouse of a named
insured who lives in the same household, or any relative
of the named insured who lives in the same household.
14

An example of excess coverage under the Widiss commentary is
if the Sandts had available uninsured motorist coverage from Brand
X insurance company and coverage from USF&G on their own vehicles
and the accident was in the Sturges vehicle.

Under that circum-

stance, USF&G would pay only after Brand X had paid.
Obviously, the controlling language of the other insurance
clause is the phrase "other applicable similar insurance".

The

interpretation of Widiss that other applicable similar insurance
means other underinsured coverage is supported by that case law
which has addressed the question.

In Polenz v. Farm Bureau Ins.

Co. of Neb.. 419 N.W.2d 677 (Neb. 1988), the court wrestled with
the interpretation of the words "other applicable similar insurance".

The court recognized that one could argue that the phrase

referred generally to other existing insurance, but held that in
the context of underinsurance the more reasonable interpretation of
the phrase was that it meant other existing underinsured coverage.
CJf. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Globe Am. Casualty Co.. 426
N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1988); Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. ,
419 A.2d 105 (Pa. Super. 1980).
The effect of the district court decision is to read out the
word

"similar"

from

the other

insurance

clause.

Also, the

reasoning glosses over the meaning of the phrase "excess over any
other collectible insurance".

This phrase is written in the

context of an insurer addressing its insured and whether its
insured collects other insurance.

The payment by Farmer's for

Sturges under the liability portion of the Sturges' policy is not
15

an insurance payment from the perspective of the Sandts.

The

Sandts are not insureds under the liability portion of another's
automobile policy. Instead, the $100,000 paid is the settlement of
a liability claim between the Sandts and the Sturges which the
insurer for the Sturges pays for the Sturges.
This point is demonstrated by the personal injury protection
coverage paid by Farmer's for Sean Sandt. Farmer's paid the $5,000
PIP benefit and Sean Sandt is an insured under the PIP provisions
as a passenger in the Sturges vehicle.

USF&G does not claim that

it is entitled to an offset against the underinsured motorist
coverage limit of liability for payment of the PIP benefit.
In summary, the district court erred in finding that the
underinsured motorist coverage was excess because it ignored the
total context of the other insurance clause.

The Memorandum

Opinion of the district court is contrary to the operation of the
other insurance clause described by the recognized commentators in
the area and fails to fit with the reality of the legal relationships.

Because there is no other applicable similar insurance

involved in this accident, the other insurance clause does not come
into play.

It would only come into play if the Sandts had other

underinsured motorist coverage on another vehicle they owned or if
there were other policies which directly insured Sean Sandt.
CONCLUSION
This Brief has shown that the district court erred in
concluding that $300,000 of underinsured motorist coverage is
available. The plain language of the policy and the very nature of
16

underinsured motorist coverage dictates the $100,000 paid by the
vehicle owner through her insurer should be subtracted from the
$300,000 policy limit of USF&G for a $200,000 limit of coverage.
This approach is consistent with the general operation nationwide
of underinsured motorist coverage. The district court further erred
in applying its interpretation of the other insurance clause as it
is not applicable to the circumstances because there was no other
applicable similar insurance involved.
This court is respectfully requested to reverse the district
court by holding USF&G has no further obligation to the appellees
under the policy at issue.
DATED this

/*/*" day of May, 1991.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY tT.7SANDERS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ATTACHMENT "A"
Underinsured Motorist Coverage Policy at Issue

.A i

PP03 11
(Ed. 6-80)

& '^1^1979

UNDERINSURED
MOTORISTS
COVERAGE

SCHEDULE
Limit of Liability
Autol

Premium
Auto 2

Auto 3

each accident $
$
We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury:
1. Sustained by a covered person; and
2. Caused by an accident.
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of the underinsured motor vehicle.
We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily
injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
"Covered person" as used in this endorsement means:
1. You or any family member.
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto.
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury
to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above.
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type to which
a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident but its limit for
bodily injury liability is less than the limit of liability for this coverage.
However, "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include any vehicle or equipment:
1. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident
but its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit for bodily injury
liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which your covered
auto is principally garaged.
2. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.
3. Owned by any governmental unit or agency.
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads.
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not upon public roads.
6. While located for use as a residence or premises.
7. Owned or operated by a person qualifying as a self-insurer under any applicable
motor vehicle law.
8. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident
but the bonding or insuring company:
a. denies coverage; or
b. is or becomes insolvent.
EXCLUSIONS
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any
person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family
member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer
of any type used with that vehicle.
2. While occupying your covered auto when it is being used to carry persons or property for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense car pool.
3. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any insurer or self-insurer
under any of the following or similar law:
1. workers* compensation law; or
2. disability benefits law.
PP03 11 (Ed. 6-80)

©'•W'' 1979

PP03 11
(Ed. 6-80)
LIMIT OF LIABILITY
~ ~
The limit of liability shown in the Schedule for this coverage Is our maximum limit of
liability for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay
regardless of the number of:
1. Covered persons;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the accident.
However, the limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums paid because of the bodily injury
by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes
all sums paid under Part A of this policy.
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be reduced by all
sums paid or payable because of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar
law:
1. workers' compensation law; or
2. disability benefits law.
Any payment under this coverage will reduce any amount that person is entitled to recover
under Part A of this policy.
OTHER INSURANCE
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our
share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits.
However, any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess
over any other collectible insurance.
ARBITRATION
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this endorsement;
or
2. As to the amount of damages;
either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select
an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days,
either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each
party will:
1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and
2. Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally.
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the
covered person lives. Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply. A decision
agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding as to:
1. Whether the covered person is legally entitled to recover damages; and
2. The amount of damages. This applies only if the amount does not exceed the minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the
state in which your covered auto is principally garaged. If the amount exceeds that limit,
either party may demand the right to a trial. This demand must be made within 60 days
of the arbitrators1 decision. If this demand is not made, the amount of damages agreed
to by the arbitrators will be binding.
ADDITIONAL DUTY
Any person seeking coverage under this endorsement must also promptly send us copies
of the legal papers if a suit is brought.

This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is written.

r

UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS
COVERAGE EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT
PP 04 05 01 88
The following exclusion is added
Underinsured Motorists Coverage:

to

Uninsured

Motorists

Coverage

and, where

afforded,

We do not provide coverage for punitive or exemplary damages.
This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is
written.

ATTACHMENT "B"
Declaration Page of Policy

IUEST

C O M P E T I T I V E PERSONAL AUTO POtTCY
DECLARATIONS PAGE

L_ w n i i _ .

CHANGES TO THIS INFO ON REVERSE SIDE - SECTION III

ST CO.

BRANCH OFFICE
r LAKt C t f Y
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B.O.

PROD.
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iRSEMENTS MADE PART OF THIS POLICY AT TIME OF ISSUE
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00^
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P*0.
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SHOW
CHANGE
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NAME
AND/OR
ADDRESS
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CITY
UT
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DELETIONS TO COVERAGES OR LIMITS.

C T I O N I - COVERAGES & LIMITS OF LIABILITY
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$7.00
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operator, vehicle, trailer, alternate
garaging address, loss payee, o
accident/conviction to be deleted
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and complete appropriate intorma
tion on REVERSE SIDE.
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55*00
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ATTACHMENT W C B
§31A-22-305, Utah Code Anno,. 1953, as amended

31A-22-305. Uninsured motorist coverage.
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption,
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or
owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or
death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or if
the vehicle is covered, but with lower limits than required by Section
31A-22-304, then the motor vehicle is uninsured to the extent of the
deficiency;
(b) an unidentified motor vehicle which left the scene of an accident
proximately caused by its operator; or
(c) an insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability
insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, but the motor vehicle is uninsured only to the extent that the
claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association
or fund.
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death, in limits which at least equal the minimum bodily
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-304.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer
that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). This
rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability
insurer.
(b) All persons, including governmental entities, which are engaged in
the business of, or which accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor vehicle, and all school districts which provide transportation services for its students, shall provide for all vehicles used for that
purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least $20,000 per person and $500,000 per
accident. This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an
iryured occupant, and does not apply to an employee who is injured by an
uninsured motorist whose exclusive remedy is provided by Chapter 1,
Title 35.
(c) As used in this subsection:
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section
63-30-2; and
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-1-1.
(5) When a covered person claims an uninsured motor vehicle under Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, then the covered person
shall show the existence of the other motor vehicle by clear and convincing
evidence, which shall consist of more than the covered person's testimony.
(6) In no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage
for two or more motor vehicles be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for
any one accident. If uninsured motorist coverage is available to an injured
person under more than one insurance policy, the iiyured person shall elect
the policy under which he desires to collect uninsured motorist benefits.
Claimants are not barred against making subsequent elections if recovery is
unavflilflhlp lin/tar nrpvinno o1a/«tiAnc

ATTACHMENT "D"
Memorandum Decision of the Third District Court

FILED ffiSTIUOraUBT
Third Judicial District

CT 1 9 1990
O^uiy Cleric

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

UNITED STATES FIDELITY &
GUARANTY COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

7

Plaintiff,

ROBERT SANDT, LINDA SANDT
and SEAN SANDT,
Defendants.

I. STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS
On .July 1G,

H989

Robert: and Linda Sandt had automobile

insurance with the United States Fidelity IS, Guaranty Company
(USJK&G) which had an 1 mderinsured

motorist policy

$3 00,000.00 per person or accident.

On the night of J n 1] y 16,

1'

1 :ia

stepson of Robert Sandt—was staying
Dustin

Sturge^

•« *<

Ton

limit of

Sc .1 1 i l l

iiiinn II

: 1riend,
older,

age

14, and

• ^ah
Ilk

City, Utah.

Alsc

» home at the time v*, Pamela Sturges,

mother 01 Dustii i and owner
accident
Sturges.

a+

::: f t .1 £

> ME .1 1 :i :::] e

- issue, a boarder , ai id ai 1 adu] t relative of Mrs.
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After the adults had gone to bed, the four boys

(Sean,

Dustin, Tony and Elijah) pushed Pamela Sturges' truck backwards
out of the driveway and then down the street a few houses with
the engine off.

Pamela Sturges had not given permission for

any of the boys to use the truck.,
around

the Park City area

The boys proceeded to drive

over the next

hours—Tony Holder was the sole driver.

approximately

two

During this time, the

boys stopped to pick up three girls of approximately the same
age as the boys.
Tony Holder, apparently with the intent to scare the girls
in the back of the pickup, started driving fast which resulted
in the accident at issue wherein the truck rolled at least
once.

Sean Sandt, who was in the back of the pickup when the

truck rolled, was thrown out striking his head.

The pickup

rolled over and ended upright with the left rear tire resting
on Sean's chest.

Sean Sandt sustained a severe brain injury

and remains comatose to this date.

In a persistent vegetative

state where he neither communicates nor moves, Sean is totally
disabled and will need lifelong medical and nursing care. His
parents, Robert and Linda Sandt, assert that his medical bills
are, or will shortly be, well in excess of $400,000.00.

C

UNITE!

* M DT

While
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the

Sandts

have

received

the

policy

1imit

of

$100,000.00 from Pamela Sturges' automobile liability insurer,
they ha ye

made a cl aim against USFU, I urn

t ho linn \\v

i uir

underinsured motorist coverage under their automobile policy.
USF&G has *
po] icy ai id 1 las I ileu
Both *!

.is action seeking declaratory relief.

plaintiff and defendants have made motions

summary

it • * .

II.

ISSUE

Whether Sean Sandt is excluded under exclusion A-3
Compar.
such exclusion

w

the

or whether

ambiguous and should therefore be construed

in idvui ui tut insured.
III.
The exclusion
I*

Co

ANALYSIS

undersigned motorist section of the
m jI 1 1 "

ill mi mi

Il iiiiiv" 11111 i n v e i . i n | t "

s i dIH S :

A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorist's
~age for bodily injury sustained by any person:

, While occupying, or when struck by, any motor
vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not
insured for this coverage under this policy. This
includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle.

UNITED V. SANDT
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2. While occupying your covered auto when it is
being used to carry persons or property for a fee.
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense
car pool.
3. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief
that that person is entitled to do so.
Plaintiff, USF&G, asserts that the contract language is
clear and that Sean Sandt was using the Sturges vehicle without
a

reasonable belief

should

be

assert

that

excluded
the

that he was entitled
from

coverage.

contract

should

be

to and therefore

Defendants,
construed

of
in

course,
favor of

finding coverage for Sean because the language of the contract
in

general,

and

more

specifically

the

language

of

the

exclusion, is ambiguous.
The interpretation of a written contract may be a
question of law determined by the words in the
agreement. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P. 2d
892, 895 (Utah 1988). In this regard^ we recently
stated that a cardinal rule in construing the contract
is to give effect to the intentions of the parties and,
if possible, these intentions should be gleaned from an
examination of the text of the contract itself. Id.
LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 857,858
(Utah 1988).
The court went on to state that it has long subscribed to the
view that "any ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an
insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage."

Id. As

UNITED V

«
P.2d

ii
780

CdJIiJ .. V"•. . Deseret Mutual
(Utah

ambiguous
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SANDT

1979)

stated,

"A

Benefit Association

term

simply because one party

is

not

necessarily

seeks to endow

it with
Ill

7 82.

The

court

then

reiterated

that

test

""»B 9

for ambiguity

a
:llt

as

originally defined :i n Ai ito Lease jCo , j/_. Central Mut, 1 n s , Co, ,
ah 2 1

,„, 325 P 2d 264

266 (1958).

The test
* applied is: would the meaning be plain
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding,
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance
with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in
the light of existing circumstances, including the
purpose of the policy. If so, the special rule [that
ambiguities are construed against the drafter] of
construction is obviously unnecessary.
Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Association \
\ ?.
This test i s sti ] 1 the rule in Utah as indicated by the court
in LPS Hosp»

Capitol. Life Ins. Co.
l

Apartments v. State Farm, 790 P.2d 5
By

using

language

whi^

Apartments v

and

unmistakably

i i i ruins' :jnr" " IIIHUT

which the expected coverage \*
exclude

iJLI±iy e Ii if i

(Utah App, 1990)

clearl

communicates

may

858-59 and

certain

losses

State Farm,

orovided"
rom

coverage

insurer

Village

Inn

contract language,
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however, may be ambiguous if it is

"unclear, omits terms,

(cite omitted) or if the terms used to express the intention of
the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible
meanings,"

Id, at 583. (Emphasis added.)

In the present

action, defendants

argue

that

the word

"using" in the exclusion provision at issue is meant to apply
to drivers versus the work "occupying" referring to drivers of
passengers, thereby providing—on
Sean.
278

its face—for coverage for

Plaintiff, citing Roller v. Stonewall Ins. Co. , 780 P2d

(Wash. App. 1989) , counters with the argument that the

definition

of

"using

a

vehicle"

in

insurance

policies

is

traditionally quite broad and arises whenever there is a causal
relation between the injury and the use of an insured vehicle.
The court in Roller [citing Sears v. Grange Ins. Assoc., 111
Wash.2d

636, 762 P.2d

1141

(1988) —

an earlier Washington

Supreme Court case] did state four essential criteria to be
used in determining whether a person is "using a vehicle."
The four criteria are: (1) there must be a causal
relation or connection between the injury and the use

UNITED 'I ,
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of the insured vehicle: % _) the person asserting
coverage must be in a reasonably close physical
proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person
need not be actually touching it; (3) the person must
be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk
oriented at the time; and (4) the person must also b e
engaged in a transaction essential to the u s e of the
vehicle at the ti me
Roller v, Stonewall Ins, Co, , a t: 28 0,
According

Washington Supreme Court, the "weight" of
I ill mi n
i ( I ni i t i i i n

MII

1s

-. motor vehicle

that passengers are users
Ins.

••. ni ni (11

i

However

i

of.

.njured party, not to prevent coverage by

~^ exclusion
In

I mi 11) mi i

Sears v. Grange

Assoc, , 111 Wash

coverage

II In

olicy.

iliII ni I ni i H I I

I lliKu i in

argumeril

II

I

II i

I <->rm

" U J . i IK;J •

i

riot

defined 1} the policy and therefore ambiguous, the defendants
i

raise two other area,!
that

approximately half

exclusion
1nasei I

nationwide

li I hi

t <• in |

Second,

:iting,

1I.E.2d 504 {..^.

<

:&t=>

dealing with the same

>olicy language w a s held

ambiguous

be!
Economy

Fire

"

& Cas. Co. v. Kubik,

4 92

1 9 8 6 ) , defendants argue that the terms

r.rt-.o
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"family member" and "any person" are used throughout the policy
exclusions in such a way as to create the impression that they
constitute

two

mutually

exclusive

classes

of

insureds.

Therefore, defendants claim there is an ambiguity as to whether
the exclusion at issue was intended to exclude Sean as a family
member and that the exclusion might be read to apply to every
individual using the vehicle without a reasonable belief that
he or she was entitled to do so, except for a family member.
The court

in Economy

Fire stressed

that the

"ambiguity

in

Economy's policy stems not from the language in and of itself,
but rather from the manner in which that language is employed
throughout the policy."

Economy Fire at 508.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because

the

defendants

subject to different

raise

several

interpretation, the

points

which

exclusion

are

language

fits into the category of language which fails to unmistakably
communicate its meaning.

Therefore, the policy exclusion at

issue is found to be ambiguous and thereby construed in favor
of finding coverage for Sean Sandt.
V. ISSUE
Whether, if coverage is found to exist

for Sean Sandt,

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company should be allowed
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offset
V I , ANALYSIS
As

aitial question concerning * - interpretation of
defendants

presented

their

*!Other

interpretations

have

Insurance"

clause, the text of which follows:
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will
pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the
proportion that our limit of liability bears to the
total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance
we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own
shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.
The
insurance"
policy,

the

and

similar

most

logica

insurance"

are

nterpretation

defined
* - *•
.w;^

the Sandts.
together

They go

t.r«

herefore mean

*:>

i

co.

visions

>i

the

^
t,

• *
by

taken

tha

-'. /insured motorist coverage where the Sandts 7
vehicle is involved
a vehiu, i1"1 t I'll1'

in I he accident.

However, with respect to

i If i mi I

*->^ $700,000 underinsured coverage "shall be excess over other

!v
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

appears

to

be

a

fair

and

reasonable interpretation of the policy.
The plaintiff, however, argues that the provision at issue
is meant to be read as "excess over any other payment of
insurance from any source of underinsured motorist

coverage."

They argue that to accept the defendants' interpretation would
be to give umbrella coverage for accidents involving a vehicle
not owned by the insured.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the two interpretations
provision may be understood

indicating that the

to have two or more plausible

meanings, this clause too is ambiguous, thereby requiring that
it "be resolved in favor of coverage."

LPS Hospital v. Capitol

Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988).
COURT RULING
Because of various provisions of the USF&G policy issued to
the

Sandts

reasonable

which

are

subject

interpretation,

the

to

more

policy

should be found to be ambiguous.

than

one

provisions

fair
at

and
issue

Therefore, such provisions

should be construed against the drafter (USF&G) and in favor of
coverage.
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Judgment

therefore

is

1)4-1 J <• I I I l i l I! Ill

Defendants

to

prepare pleadings pursuant to this Memorandum

Decision.
Dated this_ _/J_daj < » I: Octobei , i M*M.) ,

RAYMOND S. UNO v
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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this

foregoing

MEMORANDUM

DECISION

Ji .day of October, 1990:

Gregory J. Sanders, Esq.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Robert B. Sykes, Esq.
James D. Vilos, Esq.
311 South State Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Robert B. Sykes, Esq.
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